In brief, I would say:
The most dangerous form of extremism is that in which citizens take up arms against society and against the state, or where certain citizens create an atmosphere of civil disobedience and widespread chaos with unknown consequences.
Some of this has indeed occurred in the past:
1- The state of quasi-disobedience during the events of 1966, triggered by Law No. 65-026 of January 30, 1965, which made the teaching of Arabic compulsory by adding two hours of Arabic instruction and one hour of Islamic education. Some Black Mauritanian brothers viewed this as laying the groundwork for their future marginalization in this nascent state, influenced by regional and international polarization, according to the then head of state who stated verbatim in his memoirs that Senegal and France were behind those events...
The chaos reached its peak on February 6, 1966, leaving 6 dead and 70 wounded, not to mention the overall casualty count, which remains disputed.
2- The Western Sahara War (1975–1979): Some Mauritanians from the Hassaniya-speaking community joined the Polisario Front, either through direct enlistment in military operations or by providing sensitive intelligence to the Front...

This had a profound impact on our performance in that war and on the opposing force's ability to conduct operations deep inside national territory, ultimately causing us to emerge from that war empty-handed.

3- The events of 1989–1992:
Black Mauritanian militants, particularly from FLAM (Forces de Libération Africaine de Mauritanie), took up arms against the people and the army along the Senegal River and the Karakoro Valley. At the same time, parties hostile to the country capitalized on intelligence transmitted by those same elements from within the ethnic group at home...
This provoked severe and heavy-handed reactions from the regime of the time, resulting in numerous victims among the Black Mauritanian community and giving rise to what is known today as the "humanitarian legacy" (passif humanitaire), whose complexities and repercussions the country has yet to overcome.
3. Furthermore, during the country's war on terror (Lemgheity, Tourine, El Ghallawiya, Hassi Sidi, Bassiknou, Nouakchott, etc.), the state faced some of its own citizens who were involved—and in some cases remain involved—in extremist organizations.

All of these violent upheavals, which nearly wrecked the stability and public peace of the population, were not anticipated in advance. Consequently, the response to them fell short of what was required, costing the country heavy casualties and losses...

The lessons to be drawn from these painful chapters in our history are that the mastery of the "art of anticipation," grounded in rigorous contingency planning for worst-case scenarios, is the only reliable way to prevent such crises. This requires conducting in-depth studies of the underlying motives that might drive citizens to take up arms against their fellow countrymen and the nation, or to trigger equivalent turmoil, while also devising effective means to contain and suppress any such rebellion should it ignite...

Examining these past tremors reveals that the crises of 1966, 1975, and 1989 were driven by the primacy of ethnic allegiance and regional ties over a deep, principled commitment to the nation. Certain Arab citizens fell into the orbit of the Polisario—a purely Hassaniya-speaking Arab movement—just as certain Black Mauritanians sided with Senegal in hostility toward their own homeland.
It was, quite simply, a failure to manage ethnic diversity.

As for terrorism, its causes were different: some stemmed from policies pursued by the Ould Taya regime, particularly from 2003 onward, when several scholars were detained and the regime adopted a narrative that attracted extremism into a country whose extremist bases were not far off, lying just along our borders; not to mention the radical antagonism between the concept of nationhood and citizenship and the doctrine of "loyalty and disavowal" (al-wala' wal-bara') held by those groups.

A. The Intersection of Extremism and Ethnic Fractures:

The grave danger ahead is the potential convergence between the dangerous fallout of failing to manage ethnic diversity and the catastrophic perils of extremism...

The example of neighboring Mali, with which Mauritania shares a 2,374-km border, is not far off. Extremism found fertile ground in that country's ethnic strife. Many Fula, caught in intercommunal conflict with the Bambara and other groups, joined Al-Qaeda through the "Katiba Macina," which carried out one of the boldest attacks on August 2 against the largest military base in Bamako, where Malian President Colonel Goïta resides. Likewise, other groups—from the Islamic State to Al-Qaeda, Ansar Dine, and Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)—draw many of their leaders and foot soldiers from Arab and Tuareg communities that have waged armed separatist campaigns for decades and maintain their own armed wings. All benefited from the collapse of the Libyan state: numerous Azawad fighters who had served in the Libyan armed forces returned to the region equipped with heavy weapons. The Malian army frequently reports in its communiqués the destruction of armored vehicles by Russian aircraft.

In his latest statement, Senegalese expert Alioune Tine, the UN independent expert designated by the Human Rights Council who visited most of Mali's territory, stated that more than 66% of Malian land lies outside central government control...

What unfolded in Mali, transforming it into a quasi-failed state, delivers a stark warning that we must heed carefully, especially amid the political fragmentation we are currently experiencing.

B. Constraints of Our Democracy and Fragmentation

The democracy introduced in Mauritania under the 1991 Constitution was not designed to facilitate peaceful transfers of power, but rather to ensure the survival in office of those who established it. This created a marriage of convenience and mutual entrapment between traditional patronage networks (tribalism, ethnic quotas) and a political regime that relied on these structures as its electoral base.
Successive regimes have been unable to break free from this capture due to these structural constraints. Pandering to narrow, personal demands remained the political price for loyalty. A class of senior and mid-level officials emerged whose allegiance belonged to their identity groups rather than the state, giving rise to numerous sub-national entities feeding on the state's authority, justice, and development...

This dynamic also produced a deep rift within the Hassaniya-speaking community, giving birth to what may be termed the grievance narrative of former slaves (the Haratines).

C. The Haratine Question

The Haratine issue requires closer examination, as this community is on course to form a third distinct ethnic identity within society, further complicating diversity management.
The origins date back to March 8, 1978, when a group of students from this background founded a clandestine organization called the El Hor Movement, whose name clearly signaled its objective: helping enslaved people break free from their masters.
With the advent of democracy, this evolved into political action, initially allying with opposition forces before forming a recognized party, Action for Change (AC), which was later banned. Emotional rhetoric was leveraged for electoral mobilization, focusing on slavery and its legacy, which has kept much of this segment below the poverty line and subjected to condescending attitudes from former masters. This widened the divide from a class issue into an ethnic fracture. Proponents of this discourse secured seats in parliament and won mayoralties across the country. Traditional political movements, such as the Ba'athists and Nasserists, were only able to enter parliament by forming alliances with the Haratine movement, given the lack of an independent party for the latter. In the last presidential election, one of the leaders of this discourse garnered over 19% of the vote, finishing second behind the regime's candidate.
Faced with this phenomenon, successive regimes sought to neutralize Haratine opposition figures by appointing many members of this group to high-ranking posts. However, this only emboldened the discourse and deepened the polarization.
This tug-of-war eventually led some leaders of this movement to describe the country as a racist state and an apartheid regime...
This generated hostility among elites and the general public, prompting efforts to sideline this discourse from the political arena by denying official recognition to a party led by one of its prominent figures, out of fear of electoral competition. This was, in my view, a grave mistake: it pushed actors outside the law and into the shadows, with all the unpredictable hazards that entails. Proponents of this exclusion lacked foresight, as running a political party aspiring to the presidency demands round-the-clock labor and substantial resources, immersing leaders and supporters in the endless demands of institutional politics. Operating outside that framework, by contrast, leaves room for unchecked, unpredictable reactions that even movement leaders cannot control, requiring little more than intermittent propaganda across traditional and social media...

Class Conflict

This fragmentation has also spread across other social strata within Arab Mauritanian society. A clear illustration was the controversy surrounding the funeral prayer for the late artist Dimi Mint Abba, who belonged to the griot class (Iggawen); it was reported that a prominent scholar avoided attending to refrain from leading the prayer, which many perceived as a slight against that class.
Added to this is the case of Zein Ould El Ghassem and traditional artisans (mâalemine), the incident involving MP Saadani Mint Khaitour and her party, and most recently the marriage of an artist to a woman outside his caste, alongside ongoing allegations of slavery that continue to spark fierce public disputes fueled by competing claims and denials on social media platforms where hate speech proliferates. These are all symptoms of an internal ferment between guardians of an antiquated heritage and those rebelling against it, aggravated by electoral calculations and patronage.
It is a quiet war within society that surfaces at every turn, and sometimes without any apparent trigger.
Recognition of this unrest came from the highest authority in the land during the well-known Ouadane speech, in which President Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani declared: "It deeply saddens me to witness the injustice and negative perceptions historically suffered by these segments of our society, even though, by any fair measure, they ought to be at the apex of the social hierarchy, as vanguard builders of our civilization, the backbone of urbanity, innovation, and production.
The time has come to cleanse our cultural heritage of the vestiges of this heinous injustice and to rid ourselves once and for all of prejudices and stereotypes that contradict reality, clash with religious and legal tenets, weaken social cohesion and national unity, and impede the evolution of mindsets demanded by the concepts of statehood, law, and citizenship.
From this platform, I call on all citizens to transcend the residues of this injustice in our cultural heritage and to purge our discourse and conduct of unfounded prejudices and false stereotypes. I also urge everyone to stand firm against the rising tide of tribalism seen in recent days, which contradicts the logic of the modern state, undermines national unity, and harms the interests of individuals themselves; for nothing is more capable of protecting the individual and safeguarding their dignity and rights than solid national unity under a modern state founded on the rule of law.
On this occasion, I wish to emphasize that the state will remain the ultimate protector of national unity, dignity, freedom, and the equality of all citizens by force of law, whatever the cost, and will not attach any right or obligation to any allegiance other than allegiance to the homeland." End of quote.
Through this speech, the president sought an opening to break free from the traditional establishment around him, searching for a lifeline to spare the nation from the looming uncertainty that has become painfully clear. Those outside his inner circle failed to grasp this political overture. Instead, the "deep state," represented by reactionary institutions, undermined this ambitious and historic initiative by dismissing it as political hypocrisy, interpreting it merely as an attempt to calm tempers...
Thus, the cycle of corruption continued to roll on,
and an unbridled scramble for narrow interests dominated the horizon, leaving the country as a fragmented mosaic of competing cliques within and outside the ruling party, each seeking power and patronage without permitting competition.
Principles, political theories, and platforms vanished, replaced by a common refrain: "We do not want to end corruption; we want our share of it."
As a result, most development projects foundered; indeed, many were designed solely as vehicles for embezzlement to satisfy corrupt networks. The state stagnated, if not regressed, across international development indicators. Unemployment soared, looting spread, social values deteriorated, and the educational system was gutted, no longer serving as a driver of merit. Graduate unemployment rose, students abandoned crumbling public schools, disaffected youth drifted into narcotics, and armed robberies and assaults proliferated in major cities. All of this foreshadows the beginning of a collective revolt fueled by crime, which many nationals from neighboring countries could join—some fleeing wars in their homelands, others stranded after long waits to migrate to Europe, both newcomers and returnees from failed attempts. In such an environment, the stage is set for destructive forces to exploit the vacuum, led by extremism and its movements. Those consumed by animosity toward the regime could find their opportunity under such conditions, compounding both old and new foreign ambitions fueled by international competition following gas discoveries and the global race for energy resources and markets.
What strategies, plans, and measures can be adopted to avert such a scenario?
What steps must be pursued in the short, medium, and long terms to prevent falling off the precipice?
What are the strengths and vulnerabilities of each actor?
What shared strategic and security interests with international partners can exert decisive leverage in countering this threat?

And what decisive measures are needed to ensure the military and security forces are equipped to rise to a challenge of this magnitude?

To be continued